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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff /Respondent, 
vs. 
GREGORY J. MARSHALL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 890121-CA 
Category No. 10 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing does not demonstrate that the Court 
failed to consider material facts nor misconstrued or overlooked controlling case 
law. The Court correctly ruled that standing may not be raised for the first time 
on appeal and there was no consent to the search. Respondent's new request to 
consider the reasonableness of the Officer's action is improper. 
POINT I 
RESPONDENT HAS NOT MET THE LEGAL STANDARDS 
NECESSARY FOR REHEARING 
Pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, a petition 
for rehearing must state with particularity the points of law or fact which the 
petitioner claims the Court has overlooked or misapprehended. Since the 
Respondent is seeking rehearing, it is the Respondent's burden to establish that 
the Court erred. The Respondent has failed to meet this burden. 
Respondent's argument that the Court failed to consider material facts is 
stated in the Respondent's Statement of Fact rather than its Argument. (See 
Petition for Rehearing pp. 2-5) Additionally, it does not identify any material 
facts which the court failed to consider or added improperly. Instead, the 
Respondent makes the argument that neither party took the position that Mr. 
Marshall consented to search of the suitcases both in the lower court and on 
appeal, therefore, the Defendant waived its challenge to the search and seizure of 
the suitcases. That assertion in the Respondent's statement of the fact misstates 
the record in the lower court, misstates the legal burden of production and proof 
on the issue of consent, and attempts to change the basis for validating the search 
that the State has asserted throughout these proceedings. 
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable unless exigent 
circumstances justify them. State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119 (Utah 1983); State v. 
Romero, 660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983). Once the Defendant has raised the issue of 
illegal search and seizure in a warrantless search, the burden is on the State to 
prove that the search was legal. State v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408 at 411 (Utah 
1984). Until this matter came up on appeal, the State has persisted in a claim that 
the search was legal only because Mr. Marshall consented to the search of the 
property at issue in this case. (See e.g. Tl and Record pp. 164-70). As noted by 
this Court in its opinion, the State has never argued that any basis other than 
consent validated the search of the suitcases in this case nor does the record 
support any other basis. State v. Marshall, 124 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 60 at 66 n. 7 (Ut. 
Ct. App. Dec. 26, 1989). Since consent is the basis the State is relying upon, "it is 
the State's burden to establish that from the totality of the circumstances a valid 
consent was properly obtained and freely given.n State v. Iacono, 725 P.2d 1375 
2 
at 1377 (Utah 1986), citing State v. Wittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980). 
Additionally, as noted by the court, the ruling of State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 at 
980 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988), that includes a burden to establish that consent was 
voluntary. 
The Respondent's argument herein is intended to shift that burden to the 
Appellant in contradiction of controlling case law and constitutional standards. 
In examining the record to determine whether or not the Respondent has met its 
burden, a review of direct examination at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress1 
discloses the only evidence the Respondent presented to show consent. As that 
record indicates, no consent to search was evidenced or proven. (Tl pp. 4-5). 
Appellants have specifically and continually argued that the Respondent did not 
meet its burden of proving consent as to the areas and items searched, both in the 
Brief of the Appellant and at length in the lower court during argument on this 
matter. 
Counsel for the Defendant's closing argument at the time of the suppression 
hearing on the issue of consent is as follows: 
I think it's clear that the Officer had an attitude that he 
was gonna search this vehicle, regardless, and that his 
drug courier profile and hunch, based on that, was 
sufficient for him to go ahead and search this vehicle 
without Mr. Marshall's consent. I don't think that his 
testimony's established that there was consent to search 
the whole vehicle. I think that when Mr. Marshall said, 
"You could look around in the car," Mr. Marshall 
believed that he was gonna do a plain view cursory search 
1
 The record also contains the preliminary hearing transcript and a deposition 
of the Officer. It is counsel for Appellant's position, upon review of the same, that 
the examination contained therein add no more than the testimony on direct 
examination at the suppression hearing. 
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of that car. And at some point, because Mr. Marshall is 
continuing to be detained, and it was obvious he was 
being detained, this turned into directions of: "Would 
you open the trunk." I don't believe, therefore, there was 
consent to search that trunk. Additionally, there's no 
evidence that there is any consent to search those bags. 
And Your Honor, there's a recent Supreme Court case, 
additionally, that states that closed containers should not 
be searched without probable cause and without a search 
warrant, even in an inventory search. 
Tl pp. 34-35 
MR. McPHEE: He says, "Look in the vehicle." 
THE COURT: Now we've got a consent, haven't we? 
MR. McPHEE: I don't think so, Judge. 
THE COURT: Well, that is the whole issue. 
MR. McPHEE: Okay. And I don't think that the case law would show 
that there was consent. First of all--
THE COURT: Well, he said it. "I consent." Isn't that a consent? 
MR. McPHEE: Well, Your Honor, the questions becomes what's legal 
consent. "Now, can I look in the vehicle?" That's one 
thing. I may understand that to mean one thing. The 
Court may understand that to mean one thing, but we're 
talking now about an individual who's from New York 
City. We now have to deal with a subjective standard. 
What did Mr. Marshall give consent to do? What did the 
Officer ask for? 
"I want to look in the vehicle." "Fine. Look in the vehicle." And then, "Well 
let me see in the trunk," or whatever was said. Tl pp. 41-42 
For the Respondent to argue that the Defendant waived a challenge to the 
search and seizure of the bag misstates the record and is merely an attempt to 
excuse the Respondent's failure to meet its burden of proving consent in the lower 
court. 
The Respondent's Statement of Facts also asserts that the alleged "waiver" 
by the Defendant allows the Court to hear the issue of standing. (See Petition for 
4 
Rehearing at p. 3). Conversely, for the reasons stated hereinbelow, the standing 
issue was waived by the State and the record presumes, and establishes, standing. 
The Statement of Facts additionally argues that this Court should now 
consider the reasonableness of the Officer's actions and allow the State to 
bootstrap a standing and abandonment argument into an argument of 
"reasonableness". (Petition for Rehearing at p. 3) The only issue in this case is 
consent. There is no issue of "reasonableness". 
The balance of the Respondent's Statement of Facts attempts to reargue 
what the Respondent has already presented to this Court. Moreover, it persists in 
stating that a disclaimer of ownership was raised sua sponte as an issue of consent 
by the Court. In doing so, the Respondent attempts to ask this Court to focus on 
issues not raised on appeal and to ignore the fact that the State failed to meet its 
burden regarding consent in a lower Court. As set forth in its opinion, and from 
the extensive record in the lower court, it was established that there was no 
consent to search the suitcases. State v. Marshall, 124 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 60, 63-65. 
(Ut. Ct. App. 1989). 
Finally, Respondent failed to demonstrate in its Petition for Rehearing that 
this Court has overlooked controlling case law in the basis for its decision in this 
case. State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132 (Utah 1989) is the controlling case law. 
The Respondent is improperly asking the Court to overturn State v. Schlosser} 
supra or to make a skewed interpretation thereof. Based thereon, the Respondent 
has failed to demonstrate a legal basis for rehearing and the Petition for 
Rehearing should be denied. 
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POINT II 
STANDING MAY NOT BE RAISED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON 
APPEAL AND IS NOT AN ISSUE BEFORE THIS COURT 
In their Petition for Rehearing the Respondent urges this Court to consider 
several issues that were not raised on appeal and were presumed to have been 
established in the lower court.2 (Petition for Rehearing pp. 6-15). The 
Respondent has never argued at any juncture that there was a question of Mr. 
Marshall's privacy interest. Consequently, the Respondent has waived the issue 
according to the Schlosser ruling. 
In Point I, Respondent contends that this Court applied Schlosser and its 
ruling in this case to allow automatic standing. Appellant has never asserted that 
automatic standing is the applicable rule of law and this Court's ruling does not 
adopt that rule. To support its standing argument, the Respondent is once again 
asking this Court to reach the issue of abandonment, relying on an alleged 
disclaimer of ownership of the property by the Defendant, another new issue. 
Moreover, a review of the record indicates that Respondent failed to argue or 
establish abandonment. The cross examination of the Officer at the suppression 
hearing establishes that abandonment was not relied upon in this case to validate 
the search or defeat standing. 
MZ. [sic] SMITH 
Q At that time you placed him under arrest, after searching the clothes 
containers; is that correct? 
A Which clothes containers? You mean— 
2
 The record establishes, and the Respondent concedes that the Defendant had 
a privacy interest in the vehicle and trunk and there is no competent or clear 
evidence of abandonment which would legally defeat his privacy interest in the 
bags contained therein. 
6 
Q The clothes bags. 
A In the back? In the back of the trunk? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. 
Q Did it ever occur to you at that time to get a search warrant on 
opening those bags? 
A No. 
Q Why did you believe you had the right to do it? Because you felt they 
were abandoned property? What? 
A No. Because I knew exactly what was going to be in them, or a 
facsimile. I knew that there was illegal contraband inside the bags. 
T i p . 29 
Moreover, as noted by this Court in its opinion, the abandonment argument 
is supported by the State only with what is described as "somewhat ambiguous 
disclaimer" of ownership, State v. Marshall, 124 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 60 at 65. That 
disclaimer is legally insufficient in this jurisdiction to establish abandonment. 
In State v. Holmes, 77'4 P.2d 506 (Utah App. 1989), this court specifically 
set forth the standard which must be met by the state when a disclaimer is asserted 
to support abandonment and defeat standing. In that case, drug paraphernalia was 
discovered in a roll of paper towels that the Defendant attempted to stuff between 
a car seat and console in a vehicle. In a footnote the court ruled as follows: 
When the arresting officer asked defendant for the roll 
of paper towels, she denied it was hers. The state points 
out that if defendant's disclaimer of ownership were truly 
credible, she would have no legitimate expectation of 
privacy in the roll of paper towels and thus no standing 
to contest the validity of the search. See, e.g., Rakas 
v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421, 58 L. Ed. 2d 387 
(1978); State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89 (Utah App. 
1987). In making its ruling on the evidence, the trial 
court here necessarily determined that standing was not 
an issue. We note that a mere disclaimer of ownership 
in the context of a police query is insufficient in itself to 
make such an assertion. Accord State v. Allen, 93 
Wash.2d 170, 606 P.2d 1235, 1236 (1980) (since the 
evidence was found on defendant's person and was to be 
7 
used against him, there was no question that defendant 
had standing to contest the search). 
Id. at 511, n. 5. 
As in Holmes, the trial court in this case, having ruled on the evidence, 
necessarily determined that standing was not an issue.3 
The Respondent next argues that the Marshall decision imposes a duty on 
a prosecutor to object to all possible grounds raised and unraised when confronted 
with a motion to suppress. (Petition for Rehearing p. 10). Once again, the 
Respondent is claiming that it should not be required to meet its burden under 
controlling case law and that the burden should therefore shift to the Defendant 
to do the State's job for them. That statement proposes that a Defendant should 
address all issues which the State may want to raise to validate the search at any 
point in the litigation, despite whose burden it is to present and prove them, or 
that Defendant waives his right to contest new issues being raised on appeal. 
Next, the Respondent argues that this Court has misconstrued the Schlosser 
ruling. (Petition for Rehearing at p. 11) As stated by this Court in its opinion, the 
Schlosser "standing" rule was fashioned to protect the Defendant from being 
required to deal with new legal issues on appeal when it had no warning of the 
necessity to develop the relevant facts below." State v. Marshall, supra, at 61. 
As further noted, Defendant's counsel may have put the Defendant on the stand 
3
 An examination of the record and the lower court's ruling in Holmes 
evidences that the ruling was even less specific than that in this case and no 
standing issue was raised. Therefore it was not an issue and is not an issue in this 
case. 
8 
if they had ever known it was an issue.4 State v. Marshall, supra at 61. It is 
precisely for that reason that this Court should not consider that new claim on 
appeal but should rather adhere to its rule that new issues cannot be raised by 
either party on appeal. The conferences between co-counsel for Defendant, 
evidenced on the record, were specifically for the purpose of determining what 
evidence to present given the State's development of the record. 
The Respondent next urges the Court to rule that the Appellant cannot raise 
new issues on appeal but that the Respondent can.5 It has never been the position 
of this Court that one party may raise new issues on appeal while the other cannot. 
It certainly would be in violation of equal protection provided for in under the 
State and Federal Constitutions to allow this argument. The ruling in State v. 
Schlosser is both clear and controlling; not subject to the interpretation 
attempted by the Respondent. Standing for Fourth Amendment purposes is not 
jurisdictional. It is a substantive doctrine and therefore, shall not be raised sua 
sponte or on appeal for the first time. That position is supported by the United 
States Supreme Court case Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). 
The Respondent also argues that this Court's interpretation of Schlosser 
is inconsistent with prior Utah case law and in conflict with the recent Utah Court 
of Appeals decision of State v. Tebbs, 126 Ut. Adv. Rpts. 16 (Ut. Ct. App. 1990) 
4
 In fact, the Defendant was present at the suppression hearing having traveled 
from New York City to give testimony if necessary. Based on the State's 
development of the record and arguments made by the State, a tactical decision 
was made not to have him testify. 
5
 The Respondent has already required the Appellant to file a Reply Brief to 
the new issues in their Brief. 
9 
(Petition for Rehearing at p. 12). The cases cited are distinguishable, do not stand 
for the proposition that the Respondent claims, and in part, are not directly 
applicable to a standing issue under the Fourth Amendment. 
The Respondent is urging an interpretation that "standing" is the same for 
all purposes in all types of cases. However, standing is a generic legal term which 
does not have the same legal interpretation in all cases. In fact, "standing", as 
applied to a Fourth Amendment or Article I Section VII privacy interest is unique 
in its type and application. 
State v. Tebbs, supra, addresses a question of standing to raise an issue 
on appeal that has nothing to do with the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 
VII. In that case, the Defendant was challenging the constitutionality of the 
statute and an element of criminal intent therein. His standing to challenge this 
issue only arose when the issue was appealed and did not involve standing in 
connection with search and seizure rights. The Court in Tebbs found that he was 
not allowed to question the States's burden to prove the criminal intent element 
of the crime because he had pled to the charge and therefore waived that burden. 
Having done so, his standing to challenge that portion of the statute became an 
issue only when the appeal was filed. 
The State also relies on State v. Tuttle, 780 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1989). An 
examination of Tuttle evidences the same distinction. In Tuttle, there was an 
appeal of the Court's failure to death qualify a jury. The Court found that because 
the Defendant did not receive the death penalty he did not have standing on 
appeal to bring that issue before the Court. Once again, the question of the 
Defendant's standing only became an issue after trial when the appeal was taken. 
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In State v. Constantino, 732 P.2d 125 (Utah 1987) the opinion, the motion 
to suppress was made at the beginning of trial and denied. There was apparently 
no prior opportunity or necessity for either party to develop the issues in the lower 
court. The opinion does not indicate whether or not the Defendant's expectation 
of privacy in the property was raised for the first time on appeal. In fact, the 
opinion treats it as if it were an issue at all stages of the litigation. The same 
appears true in State v. Valdez, 689 P.2d 1134 (Utah 1984). Neither case 
evidences that the Defendant objected to the raising of standing in the Appellate 
court as done here. 
In State v. Valdez, supra, and State v. lacono, 725 P.2d 1375 (1986), 
both of the Defendants conceded, by affirmative testimony at trial, that they did 
not have an expectation of privacy in the area searched. There was no concession 
made in this case regarding the same. Apparently having only the trial record to 
examine, it appears that the Defendant took an affirmative contradictory position, 
regarding standing to defend against his criminal responsibility. Also in Iacono, 
supra, there was no motion to suppress or objection to the admissibility of the 
evidence made in the lower court. Nonetheless, those cases were decided before 
State v. Schlosser, supra and Schlosser presently stands as controlling case 
law. If there is any perceived conflict in the law, Schlosser should govern. 
The other Utah cases cited by the Respondent are civil cases that do not 
address standing in the context of the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section VII. 
They are therefore distinguishable from the type of standing that the Respondent 
is attempting to raise before this Court. Society of Professional Journalists, 
11 
Utah Chapter v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1169, (Utah 1987); Terracor v. Utah 
Board of State Lands and Forestry, 716 P.2d 796, 798 (Utah 1986); Utah 
Restaurants Assoc, v. Davis Co. Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159, 1160 (Utah 
1985) involve standing of an association in a civil case. None of those cases raised 
standing in the context of the constitutional protections raised in this case. A 
different type of standing is involved. 
Additionally, in civil cases where standing of the Plaintiff is in question it 
is Plaintiff's burden in the lower court, to proceed and establish their case. The 
burden is different in criminal, search and seizure cases and standing in a search 
and seizure context is properly akin to an affirmative defense which must be 
raised.6 
The cases cited by the Respondent in its argument that the Court's position 
is in conflict with the majority of jurisdictions in the United States are not 
dispositive or binding on this Court nor does it demonstrate a majority of 
jurisdictions hold that way. (Petition for Rehearing at p. 13) State v. Schlosser, 
supra, is dispositive and binding on this Court. 
The Respondent next attempts to argue that the Court misinterpreted the 
ruling in Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981 Slip. op. 4) In fact, 
Steagald v. United States validates the underlying logic of the decision in this 
6
 The Respondent appears to be suggesting, contrary to establish procedural 
law, that this Court shift the initial burden of proof and production at a 
suppression hearing and require the Defendant to proceed. They are further 
requesting this Court apply this procedural change to this Defendant ex post 
facto. For the court to provide that the Defendant proceed first would be 
impractical and shift time honored burdens of proof that have been engrained as 
procedure in the courts of this state since its founding, a procedure which was 
properly relied upon by Appellant's counsel. 
12 
case, that the State should not be allowed to take a contrary position at the time 
of appeal on a matter. At the lower court proceedings, standing was asserted and 
assumed. The Respondent now attempts to argue, contrarily, that abandonment 
can be claimed when the record reflects that the Officer did not rely on 
abandonment and any alleged "disclaimer" on the record would not legally 
establish abandonment. By virtue of the totality of the evidence on the record, 
standing is not an issue. 
The above-stated argument does not demonstrate that this Court's ruling was 
contrary to controlling case law. It only urges the court to hear an argument that 
was not raised and is not supported by the record, 
POINT III 
THE COURT CORRECTLY LOOKED AT THE ISSUE OF 
CONSENT AND CORRECTLY DECIDED IT 
The Respondent's argument in Point II of its Brief is merely an effort to 
once again bring the issue of abandonment before the Court, apparently under a 
theory of reasonableness of the search.7 Reasonableness is not an issue in this 
case and never has been. Consent to the search has been and is the only issue. 
Additionally, there is no support on the record for that argument, as stated 
hereinabove. Respondent is now bringing yet another new argument before the 
Cvuii, ar.kujg ihiis Court to ignore whether their burden was met, and examine a 
j v i i i C i i i i i i u c i ct ucvv S i a l i U d r U . H o t i f i c i c g d i S t d u u d i i i S d p p i i c d O t c * 
' The argument colorably appears to be a "good faith" argument. The Utah 
Supicmc Couri has rejected any good faith exception to warrantless searches. 
K> i u t £ V. O C fl i O SS € V, S U p f u . 
The Respondent further argues for a remand for entry of "appropriate" 
factual findings, or in the alternative, for additional briefing on the issue by the 
parties based upon the record now before the Court. (Petition for Rehearing at 
p. 17)- The unvarnished truth of Respondent's petition is that they want the Court 
to allow them to cure what they consider to be a deficient record in the lower 
court, a record that is not deficient, or is only deficient as a result of the 
Respondent's inability to adequately develop the record for its purposes. There 
is an abundant and sufficient record of the lower court proceedings. It not only 
includes the transcript of the suppression hearing and extensive briefing the re on, 
but also includes a deposition and the testimony at the preliminary hearing. 
Respondent had more than ample opportunity to develop any theories it wanted 
to rely upon to meet its burden. To suggest that this matter should be remanded 
so that the Respondent may attempt to have yet another "bite of the apple" is 
patently inappropriate and unfair; would be a manifest injustice and undermine the 
judicial system developed in this state. The record is presently complete and 
fu-viualij establishes what h necessary to support the court's ruling in this case 
• i r « 
Additionally, the argument that supplemental briefing on the issues by the 
pui . UUu U i i ^ t u Uti tiiv- i'CCOi'u u C i O i C i D e i ^ O u f l , S u o t i i u DC r C C | U i i C u , i s iii^O w i i f i u u t 
C u u j c u i VV &;•> uiw1 uTiiy uaf t ia u i i u c i w i u c i i i i i iS ^CdTCTi C O u i u HtiVC Occ'fl i i c c l l i c u i c ^ , u i . 
i k.naiil'y ^ ^ i vtliu ii ' i^ Vv ii^ uC iCi llii UCKA 0.101 I H V u t a p O i i U v u i vUiiC'v'UCu i i i ^ n y p c u u n i •.** 
S l a F i U i n g h i tfiiS Car*C 
CONCLUSION 
The Petition for Rehearing fails to demonstrate any legal basis to warrant 
rehearing. It is apparent the petition is really asking this Court to overrule 
controlling case law to allow the Respondent to change the record to its benefit 
and the Defendant's detriment. 
The Petition for Rehearing should be denied in this matter and the Court 
Mioulu affirm its ruling on the issues of standing and consent to search the 
^UitCaScS. 
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